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Abstract
This article links the buildings housing the International Criminal Court to the workings of that court by
putting the Gramscian concept of hegemony to work. It considers occulted functions of the structure and
subconscious aspects of the operations of the court. Gramsci’s hegemony is an articulation of a
relationship of power between dominant and dominated classes. This relationship is not only one
between consenting States and the court, but also between non-ratifying States and the court. It is also
the locus of a power struggle between an elite judicial class and the sovereign ratifying States. The
physical structure in which this international law is adjudicated and this struggle for power takes place,
answers those criteria of hegemony as this article will demonstrate.
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Hegemony through the Architecture of the
International Criminal Court
A. Michael Baines
I. Introduction
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is currently at the apex
of International Criminal Law (ICL). The Rome Statute (RS) which
created the ICC gave it jurisdiction over three crimes or groups of
crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Although
much discussed during the run-up to the Rome Diplomatic Conference at which the RS was completed, the crime of aggression was
only covered at the first Review Conference, in Kampala in 2010.
This young institution has elicited often contentious academic
studies covering all aspects of its difficult and necessary work. The
concepts of domination and hegemony have been used in many of
these studies even if to mainly criticize the institution. However, the
profound meaning of hegemony as developed by Antonio Gramsci
has rarely been used; the articulation of a relationship of power
between dominant and dominated classes in which a basic criterion
is the combination of consent and coercion. This article aims to
address this omission principally by considering the architecture of
the buildings where the court sits. This not only shows how the ICC
has the potential to dominate its creators but it also elucidates how
the judges of this court can develop not just the powers of the court
but also their own powers as a transnational elite. It is vital to
commence filling this lacuna as relations of power at the highest
level determine aspects of control and hence democracy.
This article is in four parts, the first of which will consider
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and its relevance to the architecture of the ICC. The second part will consider the many tensions
which are apparent from the architecture of the building. Tensions
are manifestations of power struggles and power struggles
manifestations of hegemony. In the third part the intellectuals
involved in the operation of the ICC and those who designed its
edifice will be considered. The final part will conclude first by
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considering how struggles in the judicial complex reflect hegemony
and secondly by considering some alternatives.
II. Hegemony
The author’s use of the concept of hegemony refers to that used
by Gramsci. Hegemony is used in the sense of domination by a
class (of individuals or States) of dominated classes (of individuals
or States) which is maintained by the preponderant use of one
technique. This Gramscian technique (Gramsci, 1975, Q4§38, p.
457; 1996, p. 179) is one of surrendering some peripheral
advantages enjoyed by the dominant to the dominated class in order
to ensure the latter’s continued consent to the prevailing system,
with coercion held in reserve. The way Gramsci conceived of
hegemony means that consent by the dominated class(es) is a
prerequisite to achieving and maintaining hegemony; otherwise,
there is domination, exercised through coercion (Ali, 2015, p. 241).
This strategy is also used in those situations of political stability
which arise when an equilibrium between forces is achieved.
Hegemony is then (momentarily) achieved when the dominated and
the dominant believe that there is no realistic alternative to the
prevalent order and that subject to peripheral changes, it is
satisfactory. And so the power of a class is maintained.
In the context of ICL, there are really but two classes,1 or groups,
which can be considered suitable candidates for this hegemonic
position. The first is the entire legal apparatus of the ICC as Agents
for the founding States of the ICC. Through the consent reached by
the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) and its 21-member Bureau,
the creators of the ICC dominate ICL and its materialization in any
investigation, prosecution, and trial initiated by its Agent, the ICC.
The ASP is the management oversight and legislative body of the
ICC. The second class is the lawyers of the ICC as they form a
transnational class with hegemonic traits. These lawyers are the
judges, the prosecutor, the registrar and the defence counsel. The
judges are elected by the ASP by means of a political procedure and
have a limited period to imprint their vision although their decisions
outlast their mandate. Their judicial actions are subject only to
1 In the text, ‘class’ will often be used according to the 2015 Oxford English Dictionary
definition: ‘a system of ordering society whereby people are divided into sets based on perceived
social or economic status’.
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obtaining the consent of their peers. They have no hierarchical
superior of any kind; their decisions are law. In a dynamic, globalized, polyarchic world, it is normal that there should be different
hegemonic classes at different levels of activity which furthermore
regularly impact on each other as they exercise their respective
power. In ICL as being developed by the ICC the diarchy in
question – sovereign States assembled in the ASP on the one hand
and the lawyers of the ICC on the other hand – the constant flux of
power relations is symptomatic of hegemony. ICL as a negotiated
position to allow continued rule by an elite is created by the actions
of Sovereign States when they negotiate treaties and by lawyers
when they argue in court. By obtaining democratic consent to these
legal acts hegemonic ICL is therefore the tool created by this consent. The ICC building in the Hague is the physical manifestation of
this hegemony. As Adam Morton says ‘The urban form is therefore
replete with dominant class rule using abstract space as a mode of
organizing the means of production to generate profit’ (Morton,
2018, p. 125). In such a dynamic state, equilibrium requires articulatory counterweights: hegemony calls for its opposite, for resistance. Gramsci did not define this opposition but scattered throughout his writings are innumerable references to struggle and reform,
which are needed for an equilibrium to be reached and held.
In the context of the ICC, there are several strata of conflictual
opposition (Gramsci, 1975, Q4§38, p. 455; 1996, p. 157). One such
stratum encompasses those nations which did not ratify the ICC
Statute for reasons founded in power politics or indeed others for
religious reasons. The non-ratifying permanent members (PMs) of
the UN Security Council (UNSC) have varying and variable reasons
for abstaining from the ICC, but the root cause seems to be their
adherence to a Westphalian concept of full sovereignty where
power politics are a fact of life. These States will counter the
growing influence of the ICC in order to protect that sovereignty.
The position of the United States is more ambivalent than that of
China, Russia, India, and other non-ICC ratifying States. On the
one hand its economic and military position is such that it is the
dominant party in any power struggle and it does not want to be
shackled to an independent judicial power over which it has no
control. On the other hand, it feels that it has a unique task in the
world, which qualifies it for global leadership. It aspires to being a
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role-model for all other sovereign nations, in ICL also. The US
Administration and Senate felt that personnel of its armed forces
was too much at risk from political prosecutions. One of the main
reasons for this was that US armed forces are involved across the
globe, including in UN missions. Under President G. W. Bush the
USA convinced more than one hundred countries to sign Bilateral
Immunity Agreements (BIAs) . These BIAs meant that the counterparts to the USA agreed not to surrender US Nationals (and in fact
not only members of the armed forces) to the ICC if so required by
an ICC warrant. The legality of such agreements is debated when
evaluated against the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of
Conventions which requires in its Article 18 that signatories to the
Convention should refrain from acts which defeat the object and
the purpose of a Treaty. A country ratifying the RS is obligated to
accept the courts’ judgements, orders and decisions. Being a
signatory to both a BIA and the RS would therefore seem
contradictory. Although much criticism has been directed at the US,
it should be noted that the BIAs are reciprocal.
Many other non-ratifying States (e.g. China) had problems with
the independence of the prosecutor from UNSC control. The RS
which was negotiated by consensus achieved this independence
against strong opposition from some States; eventually the large
majority of States which wished to see a court less dependent on
the UNSC and very ably supported by the Chairperson of the
Committee of the Whole, Mr Philippe Kirsch, achieved a third
means for prosecutions to be initiated. Additional to State Party and
UNSC referrals, the prosecutor could also initiate proprio motu
proceedings, albeit subject to confirmation by an ICC judicial
decision and subject to the UNSC not suspending such a
prosecution for one year. Russia signed but did not ratify, claiming
constitutional issues. It later unsigned (after an investigation into
matters relating to the Georgia-Russia conflict) and became a critic
of the ICC. India was publicly very supportive of the creation of the
ICC, but among other objections it found that the extension of the
court’s jurisdiction ratione locis to internal matters was unacceptable.
Other non-ratifying countries and their jurists resisted the
hegemony of the ICL as propounded. When J. M. Pureza (Pureza,
2005, p. 271) writes ‘[…] what some countries such as the United
States criticize in the ICC Statute is its intention of becoming a sort
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of planetary judiciary with effective powers’ he reveals a root cause
of why – at a different level from that which led to the signing of
BIAs – the United States did not ratify the Statute and is considered
to be regularly trying to disempower the ICC and so to assert its
hegemony, but some would call a domination.
The ICC building in the Hague could not have been built in the
shape and size it was, if the United States had been a ratifying and
contributing nation. The scale and the architectural splendour would
have been totally different: a brief look at the Federal courthouses
in Tuscaloosa, in St. Louis and Austin among others suffices to make
the point. As it is, the ICC building reflects the neutrality and secondpower status of its ratifiers. The ICC complex does not have any
recognisably South American, Eastern or African architectural
features: it aspired to and achieved neutrality by being a series of
contemporary office blocks with traditional global north materials.

Photograph 1, with kind permission of Leo Oorschot, Architect & Researcher

A second stratum comes from both ratifying and non-ratifying
States, many from the global south, which opportunistically revolt
against the global north orientation of ICL as practiced by the ICC.
Such opportunities are rare, principally because many referrals come
90
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from the concerned States, not from the UNSC or the prosecutor’s
proprio motu powers. The actual reasons for originally ratifying even
though rarely publicly mentioned or evidenced impede later revolt:
these reasons are often based in the desire to avoid reductions in
aid-, investment- and trade flows and to maintain cohesion with
neighbouring countries or associations of countries. Once political
will coalesces around such a revolt it may become a trend and
change could go fast. The very existence of the African Court on
Human and People Rights (ACHR) as also the Islamic International
Court of Justice (IICJ) are prime examples of how the opportunity
to trend can remain immanent for some time (see below).
The assumed neutrality of the Hague building allows for inside
gardens of the complex to show off tropical plants and exotic
growth from the global south. The garden architects had hoped that
seven characteristic courtyards representing the contributing countries,
including the Scandinavian patio with pine trees and cones, the African garden
with red soil and exciting vegetation, a lush Korean rooftop garden and a
Dutch dune landscape … [would] result [in] a risk-reducing urban landscape
and an open forecourt, which instead of barricading ICC behind walls and
barbed wire opens the institution up to the public …

Photograph 2, with kind permission of Royal Mosa, copyright holders
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Although a natural and protected dunes landscape surrounds the
complex, the gardens are only accessible to people inside the
building. The construction costs for the landscaping were €5 million
(out of a total expenditure of €200 million).2
When considering the design of the court rooms one has to
concede that, in that matter also, no practical effect has been given
to those clauses of the ICC Statute which require multiculturalism
among its judges. Here, Article 36, 8(a)(i) of the ICC Statute
requires ‘representation of the principal legal systems of the world’;
or even the Bureau of the ASP only needs such representation to be
‘adequate’ (Article 112, 3(b) of the ICC Statute). Electing judges
from different parts of the world does not help to achieve
multiculturalism when all the judges have been through the mill of
global north academic institutions. The author has considered the
curricula vitae of 53 judges elected since 2003 and divided them
summarily into three groups based on them having spent an
important academic time in any one of the three groups. The first
comprises Canada, New Zealand, UK and the USA, the second EU
countries and the third others. In percentage terms, the first has
45.28% of judges, the second 28.30% and the others 26.42% .
The courtrooms are mirror images of those found in the global
north and the antithesis of sharia’ or Gacaca courts in Rwanda.
A final stratum would be formed by the triangular relationship
between the UNSC, the General Assembly of the United Nations
(GA) and the ICC. There are geopolitical relationships along the
three sides of the triangle. First, the UNSC side. Although three
Permanent Members have not ratified the RS and therefore neither
vote in the ASP meetings nor are compelled to finance the ICC,
and the remaining two PMs are second rate powers both in military
and economic terms, all five nevertheless may individually block any
investigation or prosecution by the ICC (the deferral powers
granted by Article 16, RS). This has been used to protect
geopolitical situations for example when Russian and China vetoed
the referral to the ICC of the situation in Syria. The US abstained at
a UNSC vote on a Kenyan request, supported by the African Union
(AU), to have the pending case against it deferred, even though
2 Cf. the information from SLA, a Danish architectural company, very much devoted to nature,
appointed landscape architects for the ICC, to be found on their website at
https://sla.demo.supertusch.com/en/projects/icc-international-criminal-court.
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public statements had indicated that the US Administration was in
favour of the ICC taking such action and should therefore have
used their veto rather than abstain.3
The second side of the triangle is the relatively new phenomenon
of the GA not only diplomatically lobbying the UNSC but slowly
building what might become a normative power. The GA created a
Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2006 (Bichet and Rutz, 2016).
This HRC has installed Commissions whose fact finding reports are
acquiring more and more standing and whose language is drifting
from concerns on human rights violations to criminal activities
which fall under the ICC remit. The GA supports these
Commissions and hence exerts pressure on the UNSC. The GA
hopes to develop its normative place on the international scene
especially when the UNSC remains deadlocked whilst terrible
crimes are being committed with little chance of prosecution.
The third side is that where the ICC connects with the UNSC
and the GA. Here the judicial-political tightrope which the ICC
must follow is most difficult; the prosecutor and the president have
to consider geopolitical reality and financial constraints at every step
before committing the court to a process which may determine its
survival, let alone achieve justice in a specific case. The ICC judges
will conduct trials and appeals from a bench where no single person
can decide on the fate of the accused and it is the president of the
court, elected by the judges (RS, Art 38) who decides which judge
will handle which case in which Chamber. However, they can only
consider cases which the prosecutor presents. By Statute, judges are
intellectuals at the top of their profession. They are of high moral
character, impartial, and have strong moral principles. They possess
the qualifications required in their respective States for appointment
to the highest judicial offices. Upon a single nine-year appointment,
the 18 judges achieve diplomatic immunity, high esteem, and
financial security for life.
A final stratum of conflictual forces is visibly embodied by the
judges of the court and indeed the whole of the ICC, who exert
continued pressure to extend their jurisdiction by pushing the
boundaries of the ICC Statute. This occult violence is extremely
difficult for the ratifying sovereign States to control; common sense
3 ‘I urge all of Kenya’s leaders, and the people whom they serve, to cooperate fully with the
ICC’ (Obama, 2010, statement of 15 December).
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requires that justice be seen to be done and so it is problematic for
governments to be seen attempting to restrain this push by the
independent judiciary to extend ICL.
The dominated States develop a consciousness of their situation
in the power struggle which takes place in the hegemonic system.
Opportunistically African States resist the ICC as a neo-colonial
grab for power. This is principally a political move; they can resist
completely and individually by withdrawing (Burundi for example,
for reasons linked to its internal situation) or partially and
collectively (for example African signatory countries of the RS
Chad, Egypt, Djibouti, Kenya, and Mali invited the indicted
Sudanese President al-Bashir to enter their sovereign territory with
total immunity).
In this context it is apposite to mention Article 46 A bis of the
Malabo Protocol which grants immunity to ‘AU Heads of State or
government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or
other senior state officials based on their functions, during their
tenure of office’. But the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) also complained publicly about States
resisting investigations or trials. This expression of inferiority is a
reflection of the struggle for hegemony; inferiors will resist, propose
change and accept compromises. At the end of any struggle over
power, the inferior will give in to the dominant power after having
gained some advantage. When they have developed enough power,
they can even overcome the dominating class; the judges and
prosecutor interpreted the ICC Statute in such a way that the
Rohingya situation fell under their jurisdiction. Although this may
be only one investigation among the sixteen so far initiated by the
court, it does show that it has that latent power and will use it.
Similarly, a truly operational ACHR operating under the Malabo
Protocol would move from being in an inferior position to the ICC
to being an alternative of substance.
The Protocol (full name: the ‘Malabo Protocol on the Statute of
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights’) was signed in 2014
in Equatorial Guinea by 15 member States out of the 55 who make
up the AU. But as yet, none has ratified the Protocol. The court’s
jurisdiction extends to the following crimes, according to Article
28(A):
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try persons for the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
the crime of unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism,
mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking
in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation of natural
resources, and the crime of aggression.

During these continuing struggles the dominant class will grant
non-essential elements of its hegemony to the inferior class.
Similarly, this class is constantly labouring in such a way as to
increase its leverage not only over the decisions of the dominant
class but also over the ways and means in which it is dominated.
This opportunism manifests itself architecturally; neither the
ACHR nor the IICJ have proper, purpose-built courts. Building
such courts would be a concrete (!) manifestation of political will
and would signal that the ICC’s hegemony is physically contested.
On the other hand, these States fully realize that by ratifying in
sufficient number the treaties which empower the ACHR and the
IICJ they would thereby empower judges to consider some of their
own sovereign acts (and misdeeds).
Judges by most definitions can be classed as intellectuals.
Gramsci’s theories on intellectuals have been summarized as follows:
If social classes do not exercise power directly but through political and
cultural intermediaries, then the role of these intermediaries – the intellectuals –
in maintaining and reproducing a given economic and social order (in the
exercise of hegemony), is of decisive importance (Forgacs, 2000, p. 300).

The people who designed the ICC, the architects, are also members of the intellectual class. Gramsci wrote that the ‘Intellectuals of
the urban type […] have no autonomous initiative in elaborating
plans for construction […]’ (Gramsci, 1975, Q12§1, p. 1520; 1971,
p. 14) by which he principally meant that the initiative to construct
or not – here in a literal sense – lay in another’s power.
As intellectuals lawyers do have autonomy within spheres which
are prescribed by others. This is a classical field of struggle between
autonomy and heteronomy. Domestic fora judges are bound into a
tighter political heteronomy than international judges. ICC judges
are really independent and the prosecutor does have an
autonomous initiative (a major stumbling block for the United
States). Pablo Ciocchini and Stéphanie Khoury give some clear
indications of this by suggesting that the
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novelty of applying a Gramscian perspective to the analysis of the judicial
decision-making process is two-fold. Firstly, this analysis reveals that as judges
enforce the law, they act as legal ‘technicians’, applying officially recognized
interpretations of the law. Their role is to reproduce and conserve the status
quo. But judges can also occupy a leadership role by promoting certain moral
values. They do this by expanding, and in some cases even subverting,
traditional legal concepts (Ciocchini and Khoury, 2018, p. 77),

and further
judges lead the dominant factions of the ruling class and create consensus
within the power bloc (Ciocchini and Khoury, 2018, p. 84).

Gramsci was a convicted political prisoner of Mussolini’s Fascist
Italy in 1930 when he wrote
Everything that directly or indirectly influences or could influence public
opinion belongs to [ideological structure]: libraries, schools, associations, and
clubs of various kinds, even architecture, the layout of streets and their names
(Gramsci, 1975, Q3§49, p. 333; 1996, p.53).

Slavoj Žižek (2009) in a lecture in New York also puts his finger
on the potentially hegemonic characteristics of public buildings:
in postmodernism we get a multiplicity of codes. This multiplicity can be
either the multiplicity (ambiguity) of meanings or the multiplicity of functions
[while …] the antagonistic tension between different standpoints is flattened
into indifferent plurality of standpoints.

Assuredly the ICC court buildings are the outcome of an
enforced neutrality between not only different architectural standpoints, but cultural standpoints. And the result is a flattened, if
defensive, construction. In the words of the Danish architects:
It was a real challenge to design this building given that many nations have
signed the Rome Statute. However, we decided early on not to be specific
regarding all these nationalities, cultures, and religions, as it’s just not feasible
for all of them to be reflected in a coherent architectural design. Instead, you
have to generalize, simplify, and be innovative.4

4

MOSA, Design Studios, 2015, on Architonic Website https://www.architonic.com/en,
International Criminal Court: the Hague at https://www.architonic.com/en/project/mosainternational-criminal-court-the-hague/510326.
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Operating at all these levels are the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) . Each has its agenda, sometimes in violent opposition to that of others (e.g. right for abortion NGOs as against antiabortion NGOs). The presence of NGOs it is said was crucial to
certain clauses being incorporated in the Statute. The ‘Coalition for
the ICC’, an overarching NGO, was even involved thanks to a
Resolution of the ASP in the competition process which led to the
building of the court. The independence of NGOs from neo-liberal
hegemony must however be questioned: the very procedure of
becoming recognized necessitates conformity to certain prerequisites. This falls into Gramsci’s description of the way a
dominant class transforms an opposing force; he uses the evocative
word trasformismo to describe this method of enervating a movement
(cf. Gramsci, 1975, Q19§24, p. 2011; 1971, p. 58). This is a widely
used way of watering down an antagonistic movement’s strength by
agreeing on mutual concessions, where the dominant power actually
surrenders something it doesn’t consider vital to its interests.
III. Tensions
Courts are spaces where struggles take place, using laws,
procedures, and psychology as tools and weapons. An awkwardness
in all truly international courts has been the difference between the
common law and civil law systems, as they manifest themselves i.a.
in law, in procedure and in evidentiary matters. These differences
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have not (yet) led to damaging arguments but are at best a locus of
struggle not conflict. The possibility for judges to pronounce their
individuated opinion is an example of such a difference: although
some civil law countries allow such an opinion it is far from
universal. As Jiří Malenovský (2009, p. 39) says
It is nevertheless interesting to observe how a number of countries which
are traditionally associated with civil law systems, amongst which are some
which were faced with an excess of totalitarianism in the past, are ready to
integrate certain elements of common law in their legal systems. They have for
example introduced the practice of having separate opinions at the level of
their respective constitutional courts. Examples would be Germany (Sondervotum, Abweichende Meinung), Spain (voto particular) or the new democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia or
Slovenia). In France, as in certain other countries of civil law discussions are
being held although the situation has not yet progressed (author’s translation).

The ICC specifically allows for separate opinions (Art. 83, RS):
this was achieved not least because during consultations the judges
of the ITFY and ITFR were very positive about their right to so do
(ITFY, Art 23/3 and ITFR, Art 22 ). As the Trial Chamber shall
have three judges and the Appeals Chamber shall have a bench with
the president of the ICC and four other judges ( Art. 39/1 and 2,
RS ), there is scope for such opinions.
The crimes which the ICC handles, just as its predecessors in
Nuremberg, Tokyo or the ad hoc tribunals of Yugoslavia or Rwanda
or the hybrids of Cambodia, Kosovo or Sierra Leone, are no different compared to the crimes which sovereign courts handle: it is the
scale which is different. The legal conflicts they all concentrate on
are fought out in the prescribed arena, according to mostly selfimposed but often contested rules. The origin and the remit of the
ICC proceeds from a longue durée movement to create a forum where
ICL would flourish and that movement is rooted in the global
north. As the International Committee of the Red Cross website
states with regard to ICL:
This is the branch of international law that is designed to hold individuals
who are responsible for particularly serious violations of international law to
account before the law. The idea that individuals, and not only States, could be
found responsible for such violations started to gain ground after World War II
with the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, which were set
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up to prosecute persons responsible for atrocious crimes (International
Committee of the Red Cross, 2021).

All the post-war and post-crime courts mentioned were called
into life to handle crimes perpetrated in a specific territory, during a
specific lapse of time and, in the minds of their creators, with a
temporal finality. These pre-ICC courts came about by virtue of the
will of military victors (e.g. the International Military Tribunal for
Europe (IMTE) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East (IMTFE)), or of UN fiat such as the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the ICTY, or of a Treaty between
a sovereign state and the UN (Special Court for Sierra Leone,
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Kosovo
Specialist Chambers & Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, Special
Tribunal for Lebanon).
The ICC is sui generis; it is a Treaty Organization, ratified by more
than 120 sovereign States, which handles those crimes enumerated
in the Treaty and perpetrated in all those signatory States or by any
of their nationals, as from the date of ratification, without prescription or statute of limitations. The creation of the ICC was not
ex nihilo; it was the product of many decades of political thinking
on the expanding need for international crime to be punished.
Furthermore, it built upon the text, experience and jurisdiction of
its predecessors, especially the ICTR and the ICTY. Such an
adherence to precedent is nearly inevitable. Gramsci would have
elaborated it by looking to human sociology which shows how
institutions which appear to work satisfactorily even if to the
occulted advantage of any social class are manoeuvred by the
dominant class into being accepted by the dominated class as
common-sensical solutions, with no reasonable alternative. He
summarizes this in a most interesting sentence in a note written in
1932 as follows, where art – which must include architecture – and
law are furthermore united:
at this point we reach the fundamental question facing any conception of
the world, any philosophy which has become a cultural movement [… or]
produced a form of practical activity or will in which the philosophy is
contained as an implicit theoretical “premiss” (One might say “ideology” […] a
conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic
activity, in all manifestations of individual and collective life) (Gramsci 1975,
Q11§12, p. 1380; 1971, p. 328),
99
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which the author would link with an a contrario reasoning with a
further sentence in the same note:
conclusions that old [new] conceptions have an extremely stable [unstable]
position among the popular masses; particularly when they are in accord [in contrast] with orthodox convictions […] conforming socially to the general interests of the ruling classes (Gramsci 1975, Q11§12, p. 1391; 1971, pp. 339-40).

The legislative creep towards individual liability and the dismantling of the so-called Westphalian sovereignty of States was
resisted at nearly every stage by individual and powerful States or
alliances of such States. Until the IMTE the combined cloaks of
executing orders by superiors, reasons of state and or immunity had
insulated individuals from most (international) criminal pursuit. The
sovereignty of the territorial authority was at the basis of the Treaty
of Westphalia and so was its authority over its citizens. Between
individual sovereign States, agreements covering extradition establish this sovereignty. Sovereign States surrendered this authority by
virtue of ratifying the RS in favour of an international institution.
This resistance is best summarized by considering that three of the
five PMs of the UNSC did not ratify and that the two weakest PMs
which ratified were European.
When considering the ICC complex, its very architecture reflects
four areas where tensions occur, both visible and occulted.
A. Symbolism and neutrality
The first struggle is between symbolism and neutrality. The core
crimes which the ICC must prosecute are enormous crimes in every
sense. It is therefore right that the space where such matters are
fought out, should be accessible to all in surroundings which reflect
the magnitude of the crime. It is considered appropriate and
common-sensical that the majesty of a court be reflected in the
majesty of the building where it is housed: so works symbolism.
And indeed, as far as the ICC is concerned its openness to the
outside world, its willingness to see and look out seems embodied
by the use of very large amounts of windows. Loopholes in castles
and forts are also designed to allow those inside to observe the
outside. The polyangular style used for the ICC windows are a
requirement for defending the building, making it blast-proof, but it
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also means that the windows do not allow the outsider to actually
see in very much.

A building erected on behalf of more than 120 States cannot
project common symbols of justice, law or punishment, for they do
not exist. It had to be soberly impressive, without any trace of
cultural domination by any power. The ICC’s statements made at
different moments of the design and building read
the ICC will be housed in an iconic group of buildings that will leave visitors
with a strong image of the Court: that of an august institution established to
combat impunity by imparting justice in accordance with the rule of law (ICC
Press Release, 2013),

and then, not quite two years later, when the finished building was
handed over, the ‘design of the building reflects the transparency of
the institution and its innovativeness. It combines striking architecture with stringent security measures’ (ICC Press Release, 2015)
leads one to expect a truly memorable building: iconic, august,
transparent, innovative, striking. A Derridean deconstruction of the
latter statement cannot fail to show the divergence between what is
said about a building and what it actually is. For what does
Derrida’s work require? Analysing a certain text and exposing the
binary oppositions which form the basic structure of our way of
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thinking. The ICC statement actually refers openly to a visible
opposition: ‘transparency’ and ‘security measures’. But deconstructed, one must observe that in the legal thinking of the global
north ‘innovativeness’ in criminal law is to be repressed and only
very exceptionally allowed, not to be lauded and encouraged. Did
the statement actually warn the ASP that the court would and
should push for innovation? Similarly deconstructed ‘striking
architecture’ which is combined ‘with stringent security measures’ is
visually and visibly incorrect. The ICC building is either one or the
other: what can these competing interpretations really say about it?
That those who conceived of it were not able to reconcile these
competing goals and agreed that security should dominate the
architecture, not vice versa.
In the absence of a truly universal and homogenous culture, the
struggle between impressive symbolism and neutrality had to be
decided in favour of neutrality. The result is an expensive but
standard complex of office blocks. The impressive official rhetoric
which accompanied the opening of the ICC is not matched by the
glass, concrete, and steel on the ground. Iconic buildings are also
often actually marketing symbols on behalf of the financiers that
back the construction. The ICC is not a shopping mall or a concert
hall, so no immediate financial risk had to be taken into consideration when erecting such an edifice. However, there are principals –
the ratifying, contributing States – who act as financiers. They do
want these buildings to achieve a special status because the prestige
of the building reflects positively on those who made it possible.
Hence the legal class together with the architects and all the crafts
and professions involved in the construction mobilize the media in
order to obtain recognition that the building which houses the
Court has such a symbolic and iconic status. This encourages the
financiers to keep paying for the institution housed in the building,
hence ensuring an economic future and social stability to those that
work there. An expensive building has the sought-after effect of
(self-)aggrandizement of the sponsors and those who work there.
The architecture of the complex reflects this. It is blatantly
universally modernistic; the multitude of cultures from which the
ICC Statute emerged could not allow for any clear architectural
symbolism; no common culture could be reflected in a common
building. What was built was an ideologically neutral structure. A
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multicultural and international organization can only counteract any
objection that there was domination by its physical headquarters by
showing rigid control of size and cost and by studied neutrality. As
far as size is concerned, the ICC building and the land it occupies is
hardly majestic; at a surface area of 72,000m² and built area of
54,000m² it is hardly huge. Furthermore, the central tower is only
33m high whereas the Tribunal de Paris (opened 2019) is 160m
high. As far as cost is concerned, a final bill of approximately €200
million is not immense. In most countries, this cost criterion is the
one taken most into consideration, e.g. in England (H.M. Courts
and Tribunals Service, 2019). The European Court of Justice is
housed in buildings now with 150,000m² of court capacity and
costing €500 million,5 the new law courts in Belgium (in Antwerp, a
city of 500,000 inhabitants) have 57,000m² and cost at least €280.3
million. The Criminal Court Complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
which was taken into service in 2012, features one main tower block
44m high, has 46,330m² built in a total area of more than
100,000m², and cost less than €100 million. Neutrality in the ICC
complex was maintained: the initial proposal of having the central
tower, where the two courtrooms are situated, cladded in black
material was rapidly outvoted as possibly referring too much to the
Kaaba in Mecca. It was replaced by the idea of having green
gardens growing up the outside.
The lay-out of the courtrooms (for there are two) also reproduces that feeling of studied neutrality and technical expertise.
During trials, the human link with the horrible crimes is maintained
by the presence of witnesses and victims: but protective measures
can make them invisible again, not only to the defence but also to
the public gallery and the media. This when the judges decide that
the witness, victim or their testimony should be in camera. The
accused are normally present (at least by video-link if they are
removed from the courtroom); their behaviour is controlled by
rules which enhance the decorum of the court. There is no architectural provision of any kind for a jury; the hegemony of the judge
is considered preferable to the unpredictability of a jury. A supreme
judge, radiating expertise, is taken as a symbol of neutrality. The
5 Cf. information on the site of Design Build Network, presenting itself as Designbuildnetwork.com, the essential online industry resource for the architecture and construction
industries.
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complexity of the cases and the cost of keeping a jury empanelled
are often cited as the main reasons for never having had juries in
international criminal trials. Rarely is the equally possible reason
advanced that it is the lawyers who make the process complex and
its length inordinate. Having a jury system must produce a more
efficient and faster procedure than that which currently prevails at
the ICC. Hence cheaper, which would not be in the material
interest of the multiple agents in ICL.
B. Imagery and efficiency
The second area of conflict is between imagery and efficiency.
The Statute and the image of ICL projected by the media in the first
place is that of an implacable source of justice for all. ICC statements on impunity and concern for victims regularly accompany
media reports on atrocities and crimes; the ICC will provide justice
as it is a defence and a rampart against illegality and impunity.
Proving that the existence of the ICC has a deterrent effect on the
commission of those crimes it prosecutes is very difficult, if at all
possible. The ratifying States know that to banish crime and to
punish culprits domestically is a never-ending battle which needs to
be fought, whatever the cost. Apart from punishing the guilty, the
ICC will succour the victims from the safety of its location.
Reflecting this, the complex is a fortress, an enclosed space. It can
be seen as either keeping out dangers which threaten it from outside
but equally keeping dangerous people in who may not get out. The
building proclaims that what happens inside it is of concern to
everybody, but the larger part of the complex is hidden away from
and inaccessible to the uninitiated.
The ICC building projects a business-like image to the outside
world: this implies efficiency and expediency, expertise, and
competence. Visitors are efficiently guided through the approach
and entrance to the building. For them, this approach is towards a
blind wall with a dark access gate. The subconscious feeling of a
defensive curtain cannot be avoided. As little as possible is left to
improvisation and chance: pre-booking, X-ray machines, bag- and
person-searches, checking of passport, camera surveillance… All
such measures are considered normal in today’s security and safety
conscious culture. What use if any is made of such information is
less public. A large part of the ground-floor western wing of the
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lobby is even a kind of museum, where artefacts of international
justice are exhibited and explained. To continue the use of similes
from military architecture is not difficult. The passage to the towers
where the court itself is situated is across a bridge, with water on
both sides;

5 with kind permission of Royal Mosa, copyright holders

admittedly, there are no visibly chains to lift the bridge, nor a
portcullis. The courtroom is in the central tower, like the living
quarters in the keep of a castle. Once access – controls and checks
again, no cameras or recording devices – to the courtroom has been
granted, the comparison continues. The wide open space, the high
ceiling, the lights, the raised dais for the judges: all echo medieval
halls where kings and emperors held court. Only the total absence
of any decoration makes a noticeable difference; but with so many
cultures to satisfy, how could any harmony be achieved if paintings
or sculptures, woodwork or tapestries were displayed?
Just like courts in any sovereign state, the ICC cannot prosecute
every crime for which it has jurisdiction: expediency does not allow
for it. This is an occulted locus of tension; between the utopia of
overall justice and the reality of limited resources. Even if the
political will were present, the financial consequences of such a
policy are untenable. The ICC’s annual budget is close to €150
million with as sole purpose the prosecution of the most serious
crimes and, by doing so, ensuring they do not go unpunished and
so ending impunity. Compared to the annual justice bill of most
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developed countries this is very small and so it is not surprising that
the ICC is constantly pressing for more money so that it can initiate
more investigations and prosecutions. It has office space for nearly
one third more staff than it currently employs and just as there is no
shortage of crimes which can be prosecuted, there is no shortage of
applicants to work at the ICC. The struggle here is between the
ASP which represents the governments which foot the bill on the
one hand and the aspirations of the court on the other hand. For
indeed, the budget is financed by the States Parties; their
contributions are assessed in the same way as they are for the
working budget of the UN budget (ICC, 2020). The image projected
is that law enforcement is a business, so an office-like architecture
suits. Efficiency starts at the foundations of the complex and the
Statute itself; every architectural decision was and is budgeted, every
decision by the court also. So an ICC decision to proceed is actually
in the hands of the registrar of the ICC: he holds the purse strings
on behalf of the ASP. Even if it is the prosecutor who moves the
court towards cases which the lawyers want to see prosecuted and,
in their opinion, have a fair chance of success, it is a financial
calculation, an assessment of the risks, of the opportunities and
possibilities as also of the effects of a course of action which
determines which situations metamorphose from examinations into
situations under investigation and then into cases. Some would
argue that this is the situation in most countries: that does not affect
the argument that the RS was portrayed as the means of ending
impunity which it seemingly cannot (yet) achieve and that therefore
utopia is put back in its place whilst frail humanity is back in charge
of the multiple stages of an ICC procedure: investigation with four
phases of analysis, pre-trial stage, trial stage, appeals stage and
finally enforcement of sentence. It is a practical demonstration of
how the hegemony of economic forces pushes justice, with the
consent of all, into a subservient position. Again Adam Morton sees
the link with architecture:
Although reflective of repressive relations, or the seat of institutional power,
monuments can equally be a site of collective redemption expressing an ethical
and aesthetic power that can project a sense of alternative being, a differential
space, an awareness of utopic space (Morton, 2018, p. 127).
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This does not imply that politics (or economics) interfere directly
in the application of law, only that resources are finite and that the
judicial arm is responsible for deciding how to deploy these limited
resources (ICC Report, 2019, p. 37).
Inside the court, the image of hi-tech management predominates.
Although there is some paperwork on the lawyers’ benches, the vast
array of identical computer screens and terminals appear to make all
equal. Overhead screens and power points all imply efficiency and
expertise; guilt will undoubtedly be established.
In this sanitized world, the physical presence of witnesses and
victims is a problem for the court. A unique feature of the ICC
compared to previous such courts is that victims are to be given a
protected and special status. But their physical presence although
extremely useful for attracting media attention and coverage, is
expensive and time consuming. It also creates security problems.
And so there is an increasing use of digital and technologically
derived evidence which allows for much of this problem to be
avoided, so producing much needed savings. On the other hand
removing victims from the courtroom, removes them from the
legal theatre where the media operates. And the ICC needs the
media to put its case to the ASP directly and to the electorates of
the ASP indirectly so as to ensure its funding.
The ICC’s funding is regulated by Articles 113 et seq. of the RS
and Regulation 5 of the Financial Regulations and Rules as laid
down by the ASP with as consequence that it is the scale adopted
by the UN for its regular budget which determines the assessment
of the States Parties. That scale is then adjusted according to the
‘capacity to pay’. With some of the richest countries not having
ratified (e.g. US and China) the burden falls on the current 123
ratifying countries. According to the author’s calculation on the
basis of World Bank classification, 47 countries (38%) are high
income, 36 countries (29%) are upper middle income, 27 countries
(22%) lower middle income and 13 countries (11%) lower income.
These 13 countries contribute less than 1% to the ICC budget and
the 47 richest more than 50%.
Theatricality is what the media need to justify their expensive
presence and investment at the court, but the ICC needs the media
to project its message across the world. As the court is removed
from the place and indeed the people where the crimes took place,
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the spectators or the public in the Hague can only be symbolic, in
some way representative of those who cannot attend. The real
public, the real target of the court is those very many viewers who
can watch or listen live or to recorded material, who can read
newspapers and magazines which cover important moments. This
is the public whose opinion is vital to ensuring the power of the
court and the growing power of its permanent inhabitants, the
lawyers and their staff.
C. Judges as arbiters of law
The third arena where hegemony is an issue is where the Statute
and the judicial class articulate. Not only the United States, but
many other countries feared putting the power to sanction their
nationals in the hands of a permanent court. Relevant in this context are not only military men and women who were only obeying
orders, but also higher staff officers and political leaders. The
attempts to increase the hold of the UNSC over the prosecutorial
freedom of the ICC prove this sufficiently. It should not be a surprise that those countries where the judiciary are the most independent are those which are the most interested to curtail by law
the freedom of those same judges (Rodriguez-Garavito and Santos,
2005, p. 271). States where the judiciary tend to obey the executive
branch have less experience with and fear of independent-minded
judges. The Statute defined the crimes which the ICC should
prosecute but it was the ASP – which the ICC calls ‘the court’s
management oversight and legislative body’ (ICC-Assembly of
States Parties, current; cf. RS Art. 112 ) – which laid down in much
greater detail than for any previous international crimes tribunal
those Rules of Procedure and Evidence which the court is meant to
adhere to. The democratic legitimacy of the ASP can be seriously
put into doubt. Although States may send eminent legal experts to
debate and decide, the electoral link with citizens is wafer-thin.
Furthermore the Statute in its Articles 51(3) and 52 allows for the
judges to draw up provisional Rules which will remain in force
unless the ASP at a later date amends or rejects them. This is a
further occulted way for the judges to develop their powers.
The judges, in their very interpretations of the Statute and of the
area of their jurisdiction are combatants in an arena where the
struggle for power is continuous. When in the matter of the
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Rohingya/Bangladesh the Pre-Trial Chamber authorized the prosecutor to open an investigation into alleged crimes, the judges
decided in effect that if there was a consequence on the territory of
a ratifying State of possible crimes initiated on the territory of a
non-ratifying State, the prosecutor could investigate the matter as
the ICC has jurisdiction (ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Decision: ICC,
2018). This decision by the ICC can but irritate China, Russia and
the United States whose Ambassadors at the Diplomatic
Conference leading to the Statute raised this very specific possibility
(UN Document 2002: pp. 196, 361-362). It seems that if the judges
act in a way which the media present positively, the ASP will have
to be extremely brave and judicially creative to rein in their power.
The fortress-like structure of the court in the Hague may be an
unconscious reflex by the architects and the competition
committee, influenced by the judges who were members of this
committee, to resist this possibility of pressure being applied to the
judges’ independence: a bulwark was needed against outside
pressure. The Statute goes into great detail in order to ensure the
representativeness of the judges, who are elected by the ASP. This
to ensure that together they represent a universal desire for justice.
The Statute itself makes the compulsory nod towards the principal
legal systems of the world; however as to the qualifications of the
judges, the Statute remains sufficiently vague for the political
process to proceed unobserved. The procedure is entirely political;
there is no qualifying examination by any body of the quality,
background, opinion, ability of a proposed judge. This of course
suits States who have a dominant status in the ASP; it allows for
their opinions to be overrepresented. A cursory study of those
judges who have been elected shows how hegemonic a global
northern academic background is. The author has considered the
curricula vitae of 53 judges elected since 2003 and divided them
summarily into three groups based on them having spent an
important academic time in any one of the three groups. The first
comprises Canada, New Zealand, UK and the USA, the second EU
countries and the third others. In percentage terms, the first has
45.28% of judges, the second 28.30% and the others 26.42% . The
global north academia is not only dominant, but hegemonic: judges
implicitly consent to this.
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D. Choice of location
The fourth locus of struggle is that between existing hegemonic
powers and dominated powers, where common-sense and the
seeming lack of any alternative mean that the dominated States
submit to what is proposed. The very location of the court is such a
locus and seemed a sensible solution.
The economic value to that city of pulling in such a prestigious
body as the ICC which might have over 1,000 well paid international civil servants is immense (van de Wijngaard, 2012).
Rwanda wanted the ICTR to be located in Kigali, but eventually
accepted that it should be Arusha in Tanzania. An automatic consequence was that the Rwandan Government’s intention of having
many thousands of accused prosecuted by an international tribunal
became a dream. By going to Arusha a severe selection had to be
made. The ICTR eventually indicted less than 100 persons, mainly
because of the logistical and financial burden of moving evidence,
victims and accused over 1,000 kilometres.
During the Rome Diplomatic Conference and later discussions
the consensual and common-sensical location, under the hegemony
of the global north, was to place the ICC somewhere in Europe.
Locating the ICC in the United States, Russia, or China, who were
at best going to sign but never ultimately ratify the Statute was
never contemplated. A similar mind-set determined that the ICC
needed one prestigious and permanent building where ICL would
be practised. This mind-set of having one permanent, fixed location
was elaborated over 60 years; there seemed no alternative to the
Hague which already had many international institutions, including
the International Court of Justice. This mental and psychological
attitude mirrored the cultural background of the vast majority of the
participants at the Diplomatic Conference, ASP Meetings, and
those committee members who considered and voted on the
premises of the ICC.
As Richard Bower writes:
The wider potential for strategic change in such projects is rarely able to be
followed through. They remain isolated by political and social entropy that
seems to stifle architectural projects that attempt to exist outside conventional
Westernized hegemonic relations (Bower, 2016, p. 117).
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It seems therefore that again economic interests and motivations
build consent in accepting that there is no seeming alternative; the
cost of building the court, of maintaining it, of the many thousands
who earn their living in and around it must be accepted and the
interests of bringing justice close to the victims and perpetrators a
very much less important fact. This is a clear manifestation of
hegemony by economic forces of the global north.
The procedure and rules which governed the competition
organized to find the best design for the premises were similarly a
manifestation of that hegemony: the participants had to establish
that they had 10 years’ experience, had submitted a similar project
in the last 10 years, had at least 20 employees in the last three years
and had to show technical aptitude for such a project (Jansen,
2011). Young, less experienced, less financially strong but possibly
creatively stronger architects would have had very little chance of
getting over these hurdles. And so the architectural style of the ICC
complex reflects the hegemony of global northern aesthetic norms
which are, for public buildings, a continuation of those prevalent in
large privately financed buildings. But the pre-ordained outcome of
this struggle, this tension, was occulted by the very rules of the
competition, which appeared neutral. A dominated architectural
class locked in a hegemonic situation can however show resistance
by developing its very own style. The Egyptian Supreme Court
building, finished in 2000, is an excellent example of an alternative
outcome to such a struggle. The neo-pharaonic elements contrast
totally with any contemporary public building in the global north.
On the other hand, the ACHP court (‘African Court on Human
and People’s Rights’) on with an annual budget just above €9
million) established in Arusha creates a treble contrast with the ICC
complex:
i.
Rented and circumscribed.
First, it is not (yet) in a purpose-built edifice, but manages with
temporary premises. Most striking for the approaching visitor and
contrasting with the ICC is the very large sign over the main
entrance: ‘Welcome to the African Court’. The African Court
Protocol may as yet not cover such horrific crimes as the ICC does
but, as indicated above, the Malabo Protocol – when a sufficiency
of States will have ratified it – will give the ACHP such a
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competence and the court will create a new section to handle these
cases (Protocol on Amendments, Article 16, paragraph 1 and 2).
This development virtually ensures that when a sufficient number
of States have ratified, the ICC’s role will be curtailed in Africa at
least, by the operation of the clause of complementarity. It hardly
needs stating that the ultimate dominant class on the African
continent is no different to the one which operates in the ICC
context: the beneficiaries of the neo-liberal globalized economy.
Class structure is just as powerful regionally as it is on a global basis.
The confrontational aspect here is actually double. There is on the
one hand the perceived advantage that activating the ACHP diminishes the power of the ICC but on the other hand the regional élite
apprehends full well the disadvantage which might flow from the
fact that the judges appointed to the ACHP will, just as their ICC
confrères, seek to expand their role. The AU’s position is maybe
therefore also ambivalent. On the one hand, it is well known that
the AU’s position with regards to the ICC is usually negative: the
AU has stated that they encourage the withdrawal from the ICC of
African signatories from. The AU was instrumental in the matter of
the Kenyan situation: it asked the UNSC to request deferral of the
ICC’s investigation. On the other hand the AU has not pushed
strongly for development of the ACHP.
An appointment to the ACHP will follow occluded rules prevalent in most if not all bureaucracies; a fin-de-carrière successful candidate will be usually grateful to the authority which gave him or her
such a position but at the same time wish to show some independence in their last rulings and decisions. To paraphrase Malenovský:
the personality of the ‘national’ [arbiter] judge reveals two contradictory
aspects: on the one hand, that of a docile and privileged interpreter of the legal
arguments advanced by his state and on the other hand that of an independent
expert who cannot act as simple [representative] agent of a State, as if just a
diplomat (Malenovský, 2009, p. 43: author’s translation).

ii.
Individuals or sovereign States?
The second contrast is proximity to people. Eight AU member
countries have signed the Additional Protocol which allows
individuals and NGOs to submit complaints. Although such a large
proportion of those complaints emanated from Tanzanians that
that country has in principle withdrawn its ratification of the
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Additional Protocol, the principle has been established that individual victims may approach that court at least and apply for relief,
sanction, and indemnity. This is not possible at the ICC.
iii.
Global or continental?
The third contrast is that the Rome Statute attributed to itself a
position as the fount of global norms. The Preamble of the ICC
refers to ‘all peoples’, whereas the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights not only restricts itself to Africa but proudly refers
to a common African heritage and struggle against colonialism. The
globalism of the ICC and its basic lack of common historical and
cultural past mean that it has a profound weakness at its heart,
which the African Charter does not have.
The other locus of the struggle within civil society over ICL
clearly shows that the conflict over ideas which is continually taking
place occurs in layers. The dominant powers wanted the precedent
set by their post-war military tribunals to form the basis for any
future ICL. This precedent determined not only how such Tribunals were created but also the rules and procedure which they
would follow. The economic and ideological collapse of the Soviet
bloc allowed a hegemonic United States to successfully push for
further judicialization of humanitarian law at an international level.
The UNSC and the General Assembly approved the ad hoc creation
of the ICTY and ICTR; their rules and procedure follow nearly
seamlessly from those of the IMTE and IMTF. As Gramsci pointed
out when discussing common sense and the difficulty of finding
alternatives, the very nature of law means that what has been done
and seen to work, is copied. When the Statute was being negotiated,
it became clear that the United States was worried about the
independence of the court from the UNSC, where it had a veto
power. China and Russia voiced similar fears and eventually all
three did not ratify. The Westphalian principle of sovereignty played
an equally very important role, especially as all three States feared
the risk their nationals would face. The very strong support for the
ICC from principally the EU, but also South American and still
many African States, can actually be considered as a move by them
against United States hegemony (with China and Russia). In Gramscian terms, it is clearly the weaker States which see advantages in
supporting the ICC against the hegemon.
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The United States consents to certain uses of ICC power in cases
where humanitarian law is at stake and where it feels the ICC is
moving in the correct way. Their abstention on (rather than veto of)
the Darfur referral to the ICC prosecutor is a case in point. On the
other hand, their very status as a military and economic hegemon,
makes them see themselves as in a vulnerable situation vis-à-vis a
court which could for blatantly political reasons assert jurisdiction
over its nationals. The United States is also used to the judicial
supremacy of its own Supreme Court which theoretically at least,
can be controlled by constitutional changes enacted by their
democratically elected institutions. It is the US President, flanked by
the US Senate, who appoints the judges. This is not the way most
of the ASP countries submit names of future ICC judges. A sign of
this Westphalian inheritance is the possibility for ratifying States to
emit reservations to Treaties they adhere to. In the case of the ITFY
and ITFR, such a possibility was not possible to the international
community of States, as it was the UNSC which created the
Tribunals. In the case of the ICC which is a Treaty organization, the
right to reservations was specifically excluded under Article 120 of
the RS.
Opposition to the ICC can also be nascent: the IICJ is to date
irrelevant. However, as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
has 56 member countries which together represent slightly more
than 17% of the world’s population, its empowerment would
represent a very significant move down an alternative and antagonistic path. In its Statute, Sharia is taken as the cornerstone of
law; a clearer conflict with the ICC cannot be envisaged. Adam
Baczko’s recent ground-breaking study of the Taliban courts in
Afghanistan is foundational here. Three processes best demonstrate,
in the opinion of the author of this article, the underlying difficulty
in harmonizing the global north and Islamic legal systems when
they confront each other in the legal arena.
First, rotation: the Taliban try to rotate judges every 6 months
(Baczko, 2021, pp. 190 et seq.): whereas ICC judges every 9 years.
Secondly, procedure: using professional counsel is not allowed and
oral testimony is preferred (Baczko, op. cit. p. 235). Thirdly, speed:
Taliban courts pride themselves on the celerity of their decision
making: most judgements are made within days (Baczko, op. cit.,
pp. 236 and 289). From an architectural point of view, the distance
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between all parties and the judge, sitting cross-legged in a private
home, and the assembled lawyers in an ICC courtroom is immense.
But Baczko unwittingly evokes a Gramscian principle when he says
the judicial system of the Taliban gives an advantage to people who have
had a religious education, understand the language and the essential points of
Islamic law […] As the state’s law is sharia’h, the Islamic jurisconsults have an
interest in the state. By defending the application of a law and of judicial
procedures separated from the specific interests of the conflictual parties, the
ulemas universalize their own interest, that of a social group which does not
have any economic capital […] By their moral discourse and legal practice, they
promote a society in which the religious form of cultural capital obtains levers
to power and decision making (Baczko, op. cit., p. 297: author’s translation).

There are differences between the Statutes governing the ad hoc
Tribunals and the ICC, as there are between the buildings where
they are situated. The ICC is in a purpose-built complex; with the
exception of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, all other courts and
tribunals were housed in existing buildings. When considering the
physical architecture of the ICC complex, its blandness is in some
way a reflection of the court’s basic status among international
courts. Although it is the ultimate forum, its competence is residual:
it is only competent if no national court properly addresses the case.
Such a limited competence was considered a very important concession by the majority of nations (which had wanted an ICC which
could hear a case in all circumstances) to the United States. Complementarity in fine means that if a state prosecutes in acceptable
circumstances an accused over whom the ICC is competent, the
ICC cannot start proceedings. The clause creates a last chance, a
kind of safety net to ensure that impunity cannot reign.
This concession did not suffice to bring the United States, China,
India or Russia on board. A building without sharp edges or points,
which projects static equilibrium, answers this requirement of not
being aggressive, but blending into a quiet background. The local
building regulations in the Hague comfort this view; no building,
even in the international zone, even for an international organization, can escape these provisions. These laws, regulations, and
decrees reflect the image of the host country, the Netherlands, as a
constitutional and parliamentary monarchy. Its colonial past has
been buried so deeply that it is accepted, consensually, as an
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unexceptional, peaceful country. It makes common-sense that such
a country should host an additional court in a city which even the
UN has acknowledged as an international city of peace and justice.
IV. Hegemony by unusual classes
Gramsci’s theories on hegemony have been used as explanatory
building blocks progressively for more and more human activities.
Law and architecture have remained relatively immune from the
consequences which a confrontation with those theories would
produce. There are two probable reasons for this, the first being
that there is an academic and media concentration on politics and
political economy as more obviously an area of struggle, power, and
control than on law or architecture. The second is that the intellectuals involved in the articulation of this hegemony, i.e., the legal
and the architectural profession, are protected by their consensual
status as experts working on behalf of a superior ideal. In the case
of law, this ideal is justice and neutrality; in the case of architecture,
aesthetics and functionality. The author would propose the
following aperçu of Gramsci’s important and complex work on the
place of intellectuals in a hegemonic structure.
Those who believe they are autonomous are traditional intellectuals, and those who are linked to a social class are organic intellectuals. This is not a scientific classification, only one established for
analytical purposes. Indeed an intellectual or a group of intellectuals
can change from organic to traditional or have characteristics of
both types. So where would architects and lawyers fit in this
changing society? Typically, lawyers will be traditional intellectuals.
The successful exceptions (for example Cromwell, Robespierre,
Gandhi) will coalesce a rising class of interests around them and
establish a new hegemony. Architects are artists. As Gramsci says in
Notebook 3§155 they are able to demonstrate their art on paper
only; they do not actually have to build anything. It is in fact when
they move to realization of their project that their intellectual
typology is modified, as they then have to submit consensually to
their principals, those who give them their practical task.
Architects as intellectuals
Architects are constrained by three classes of barriers. The first is
financial; whatever the architects’ views on the building they are
commissioned to design, the principal will decide what the budget is
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and what can therefore be built. This applied very much to the ICC
complex and affected the final design in many ways.
The second is technical; this covers security matters (concrete
walls, blast proof windows…), local building regulations (height of
building, square metres per employee…) and functional
requirements (media presence leading to provision of high-tech
communication facilities).

Finally, aesthetics themselves must submit to the principals’
wishes. A structural feature which could refer to a religious symbol
(the Kaaba) had to be withdrawn but another incorporated: gardens
and plants, from all the continents, were encouraged as they
symbolized an apparent universal liking for greenery. But for
security reasons they were placed between the towers and so only
visible to those who come into the complex. This strongly
diminishes the value of the public statements that they are a natural
continuation of the dunes on the northern side of the ICC,
themselves in a highly protected nature reserve.
Gramsci’s comments on architecture and Rationalism (Gramsci,
2017), his views on Futurism (Gounalis, 2018; Holub, 2014) show
how he understood that space and its divisions were strong ways
for hegemony to manifest itself. The global north’s ideology still
rests on a scalar frame for assessing importance: the level of funds
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allocated to architectural spending on spatial delimitation, control
and order determine importance. Efficiency and security are invoked to insure this, suppressing alternative claims as for example
closeness to the people, accountability and simplicity. Courtrooms
built to handle minor offences are smaller than Assizes, just as the
monetary fines often dispensed in the former weigh less than life
sentences delivered in the second. In times of seemingly endless
growth, as Gaëlle Dubois (2014) shows when considering the
Belgian architect Poelaert’s plans for the Brussels’ Palace of Justice
or in times of desperately holding onto a disappearing past as
Miriam McKenna (2020) shows, this proportionality is lost.
Lawyers as intellectuals
Lawyers in the ICC context are theoretically united in achieving
criminal law’s purpose: establishing the truth. This is achieved by
convincing the judges of which version of the truth best fits the
facts as presented in court. Such a version arises out of a struggle, a
conflict, between teams. This conflict does not occur in a vacuum;
it takes place in a building whose very structure determines who can
access which parts. It takes place between professionals whose
expertise determines which version has the best chance of being
accepted. Expertise comes at a cost, which in the case of the ICC
means virtually entirely at the court’s expense. This means the ASP
or further down the line, the individual ratifying States and even
their individual taxpayers foot the bills. The size of the ICC’s
budget, which is managed by the registrar, determines which
situations will be investigated, which cases opened, which
prosecutions initiated. Irrespective of those judicial steps, the staff
will get its UN-related salary, whether there is one accused or none.
Defence counsel also is paid by the ICC unless the accused is found
to have sufficient means; it is the registrar who in fine decides on the
budget for the defence. These judges, prosecutor, registrar and
counsel are allocated separate spaces in the ICC building and access
from one space to another is controlled. Access to the courtroom is
similarly controlled to ensure physical independence; judges do not
access the court the same way as defence, witnesses cannot meet
the accused, judges don’t share the same canteen as the others. In
all these ways, the inner architecture of the building reflects the
dominant ideology.

118

International Gramsci Journal No. 15 (2nd Series /Seconda Serie) Winter / Inverno 2021

Lawyers and architects fall neatly into Gramsci’s descriptions of
intellectuals. They appear as principally experts and technicians with
specialist knowledge; fundamentally and functionally they are the
tools of the dominant group of the society where they live and
work. As tools, the architects obey the rules imposed on them as far
as dividing and classifying space is concerned just as the lawyers
submit to their place in a hierarchy. They work in a hierarchical
hegemony which imposes the proper procedure to be followed
when faced with a situation leading to a predetermined range of
results. And so lawyers and architects are not at all autonomous
from the hegemonic socioeconomic class; the public image these
classes broadcast of working on behalf of the rule of law or the
satisfaction of functionality whilst being free of politics and
ideologies is mythical. There is coercion operating on the architects’
autonomy. Although the judges and the prosecutor are free of
obvious constraint, the budget can decide which situation becomes
a case and so they too are coerced.
V. Conclusion
Lawyers as motors for change
The public image of the ICC Statute and the Rules as well as the
public image of a neutral and permanent ICC building, appear to
reflect the primacy of the rule of law and the functionality of the
building. We have seen that these images emanate from the overarching hegemony of the ASP and its working committees, where
representatives of sovereign, preponderantly neo-liberal States lead
the discussion and channel the decisions. One group of lawyers has
the potential to fundamentally break the ICC away from this
hegemony and determine an independent future: the judges. We
classified three sub-groups as lawyers; the judges themselves, the
prosecutor, and the registrar. In fact, they form a transnational élite
whose common interest is their profession and their status. The
judges of the ICC have no judicial masters; their Appeal Chamber
has the final word on any matter submitted. The prosecutor, also
elected for a non-renewable term of nine years, has no judicial
masters either and benefits from the same élite status. Furthermore,
he or she is the centre of media attention and the best pressure
point for non-judicial influence. The registrar, elected for five years
only but re-eligible once, is a very powerful actor through his or her
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preponderant weight in all matters administrative and financial.
Funding lies at the nexus of ICL’s operations, and the ICC is no
different than other tribunals in this matter. Donations to the
Special Court for Sierra Leone increased substantially once it
announced that Charles Taylor would be tried in the Hague rather
than in Freetown; no link between the donations and the locus for
the trial has been proven.
The judges are in a position to interpret the ICC Statute and
adjust the Rules with no limit or control beyond that imposed by
their conscience and their peers’ consent. This countervailing
strength (when put against the ASP as agents for their principals,
the dominant sovereign states) has been used multiple times; the
judicial class can be inferior in one relationship and hegemonic in
another. The power of the judges can be seen in the following
decisions: changes to the immunity of heads of state, territorial
extension of jurisdiction, extension of jurisdiction from international to internal conflict, reduction of number of judges in cases
of administration of justice sitting on pre-trial, trial, and appeal. The
ICC went so far, in this latter case, as to invoke a neo-liberal prerequisite: ‘efficiency would be improved’. The prosecutor can be the
voice of this policy: the ‘Policy Paper on Case Selection and
Prioritization’ of September 2016 (ICC 2016, pp. 5, 40-41) stated
that ICC Statute crimes which result in the destruction of the
environment would be given particular consideration. This when
the Statute itself mentions the word environment just once.
The architecture of the ICC was considered and debated by
committees established by the ASP. The manifest result of their
deliberations and decisions is a balance between making the
building important but also insignificant among other office
buildings. As to the inside, the position of the court and the judges
was visibly kept central but some kind of equilibrium was kept by
enhancing the role of the prosecutor. This organ was granted a large
amount of space. The registry has the most working area but this
important status is occulted from the public. A preponderant
working area for administration and finance is not considered the
correct image for the court to broadcast.
It can be concluded from this study of the reciprocal influence
which hegemony and architecture have on the operations of the
ICC, that no great change was expected in the way that the worst
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crimes against humanity were going to be prosecuted or the degree
of impunity of the perpetrators of these crimes. The hopes of the
victims past and especially future therefore must lie in the still
dormant power of the judges of the ICC to seize the opportunity
which they have been given to effectively use the tools to hand to
create just law.
VI. Appendix
Possible adaptations to the Court and the Statute
A final consideration would be to consider what realistic alternatives can be proposed which have the greatest chance of gathering sufficient support to achieve a judicial system closer in every
way to the people. The author insists on using the word ‘realistic’.
The RS is not only a tool for hegemonic forces, but also a utopian
charter. To the extent changes are desired, these will only be
achieved by slow and concerted action over many years. The author
proposes hereafter a very short list of those changes which should
reduce the underlying domination by certain States (moving trial
away from a global north location), by judges (allowing juries and
judges from States directly involved), by bureaucracy (make trials
faster).
Physical adaptations
The court is not only a social complex, it is a physical complex
which lacks empathy and funding. The author believes there is an
inexpensive and rapid intervention which could change the face of
this office building: use of the roof and parapet for visual stimulus
and advertising. Coloured lights, including strobe lights with or
without messaging would truly illuminate the court. During
daytime, changing the fortress appearance is achievable again with
the creative use of painting with light. At marginal cost the
multitude of cultures involved in achieving justice and prosecuting
criminals can be achieved in an up-to-date form which will also
ensure continued media attention.
Statutory adaptations
We would propose five adaptations.
The first adaptation would be that no prosecution takes place in
the Hague but only in the country where the crimes were committed or in the country of origin of the victims, in temporary
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premises. It would be a requirement that these premises be close to
operational public transport. This can be achieved by the addition
of the following to Article 3:
1. The principal seat of the Court shall be established at
The Hague in the Netherlands (‘the principal host State’).
2. The Court shall enter into a headquarters agreement
with the principal host State, to be approved by the
Assembly of States Parties and thereafter concluded by
the President of the Court on its behalf.
3. For the Trial stage of the proceedings, the Court shall
sit in the country where the serious crimes were said to
be committed or from which the victims originate, unless
it considers it undesirable
Rule 100 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to be
adapted in consequence.
The second adaptation, that the trial start within one month of
arrest, terminate within a certain period, and that the court deliver
its verdict within a certain time limit. The following changes to
Article 29 would achieve this:
1. No change suggested
2. Notwithstanding the imprescriptibility of the crimes,
no trial shall start later than 30 calendar days from the
transfer of the incriminated person to the Court and
no trial shall continue beyond 180 days from its
commencement and a verdict delivered within 30 days
thereafter
Rule 101 of the Rules of procedure on evidence to be changed by
adding a third paragraph:
3. The Court shall issue its judgement within one
calendar month of the 180th day of the commencement
of the trial, failing which a decision of not proven will be
issued by the Registrar.
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It follows from a severe time limitation, that the presence of the
accused should no longer be a requirement. A small addition to
article 63 would solve that:
1. The accused shall preferably be present during the
trial.
A fourth adaptation would be that the required uneven count of
judges include one from the country of the indicted person and one
from the victims’ country if different. This would make the argumentation about victors’ justice redundant and bring the judicial
process closer to those more directly involved.
There shall be a new article 42:
Article 42. National judges
1. The judge elected by the Assembly of States Parties
shall be in Chambers with one judge appointed by the
State Party where the victims or the crimes have their
origin and one judge appointed by the State Party of the
country of origin of the incriminated person. Should
there be plurality of sovereign territories involved, the
President will determine which State Party has the
preponderant interest in appointing a judge.
A consequence of involving more closely the territory where the
crimes occurred in the human and practical stage of the trial is to
keep the ICC for procedural matters only. The ICC in the Hague
would function as a Cour de Cassation or Supreme Court: on points
of law only. As proposed above, the Trial court would take place in
the place much closer to where the crimes occurred, the victims and
the perpetrators originated from.
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